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COMPLETING THE PICTURE OF UNCERTAIN
PATENT SCOPE
GREG REILLY
I. INTRODUCTION
Uncertain patent scope is perhaps the most significant problem facing
the patent system.1 Uncertainty in patent rights leads to avoidable
infringement; suppressed competition; inefficient innovation, investment,
and licensing decisions; increased business costs; and unnecessary
litigation.2 This uncertainty has long been blamed on the Federal Circuit’s
rules for interpreting claims, the short summaries at the end of the patent
that define the patentee’s exclusive rights.3
Near the end of this Term, the Supreme Court tackled uncertain patent
scope in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,4 but not by addressing
interpretation of patent claims (known as claim construction). Instead, the
Supreme Court addressed the standard for determining whether patent
claims are invalid as indefinite for failing to “particularly point[] out and
distinctly claim[]” the invention.5 Suddenly, large segments of the patent
community blamed uncertain patent scope on the Federal Circuit’s lax
indefiniteness standard, which only invalidated a claim “when it is not
amenable to construction or insolubly ambiguous.”6 Tightening the
indefiniteness standard—whether by rendering a claim indefinite when it
“is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation,” as Nautilus
and some amici proposed,7 or only when it is not “reasonably clear” to
 Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School.
1. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 10 (2008).
2. See FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 76–80 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
3. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1033–36 (2007).
4. 542 U.S. __; No. 13-369, slip op. (June 2, 2014).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
6. Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quotations
omitted), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014).
7. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Nautilus, No. 13-369, 2014 WL 768314, at *2 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2014)
[hereinafter Nautilus Br.]; see also Brief of Amazon.com, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 16, Nautilus, No. 13-369, 2014 WL 828060, at *16 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter
Amazon Br.]; Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor Peter S. Menell in Support of Neither Party at 38–39,
Nautilus, No. 13-369, 2014 WL 880962, at *38–39 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Menell Br.].
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people working in the field, as other amici proposed8—was said to be a
panacea that would provide “competitors and the public with clear
guidance on what is and is not prohibited.”9
The well-established problems with the Federal Circuit’s claim
construction rules were almost entirely ignored in the materials submitted
to the Supreme Court. Rather, the Court was incorrectly told that claim
construction has “no bearing on whether the boundaries of the claim itself
are definite to a skilled artisan”;10 that indefiniteness is resolvable without
the need for claim construction;11 and even that claim construction is “a
task that courts are well-equipped to undertake using existing law.”12 As a
result, the Supreme Court resolved Nautilus with only a partial view of
uncertain patent scope, a view that did not include what was widely seen
as the source of the problem until the Court granted certiorari in Nautilus.
In doing so, the Supreme Court held “that a patent is invalid for
indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the
patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable
certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention,” without
providing any further guidance as to what constituted “reasonable
certainty.”13 Early commentary has been critical of this lack of guidance,
with one commentator concluding, “we know very little more about the
subject now that we’ve seen the opinion than we did before.”14
This Commentary completes the picture by addressing the intertwined
relationship of claim construction, indefiniteness, and uncertain patent
scope. Claim construction is a necessary threshold step and, if effective,
can resolve uncertainties in claim scope, reducing the need to invalidate
claims as indefinite, as discussed in Part II. Part III demonstrates how the
Federal Circuit’s failed claim construction rules accentuate, rather than
8. Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Property Owners Ass’n in Support of Neither Party
at 4, Nautilus, No. 13-369, 2014 WL 891766, at *4 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter IPO Br.]; see also,
e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae AARP in Support of Petitioner at 7, Nautilus, No. 13-369, 2014 WL
880961, at *7 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter AARP Br.]; Brief of Yahoo! Inc. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Reversal at 5, Nautilus, No. 13-369, 2014 WL 880959, at *5 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014)
[hereinafter Yahoo! Br.].
9. Brief of Nova Chems. Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 21, Nautilus, No.
13-369, 2014 WL 880957, at *21 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014).
10. Nautilus Br., supra note 7, at 46.
11. Amazon Br., supra note 7, at 18–19.
12. Brief of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 5, Nautilus, No.
13-369, 2014 WL 880963, at *5 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter ABA Br.].
13. Nautilus, No. 13-369, slip op. at 1.
14. Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Justices take blue pencil to Federal Circuit opinions on
definiteness, SCOTUSBLOG (June 3, 2014, 10:49 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/opinionanalysis-justices-take-blue-pencil-to-federal-circuit-opinions-on-definiteness/.
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resolve, ambiguities in claim scope. Part IV explains how the
ineffectiveness of claim construction increases the need for an effective
indefiniteness doctrine, but, perversely, both decreased the effectiveness of
the Federal Circuit’s pre-Nautilus standard and renders any stricter
standard too draconian. Part IV proposes that the best way to address
uncertain claim scope is to make claim construction more effective, while,
surprisingly, largely retaining the Federal Circuit’s pre-Nautilus
indefiniteness standard.
II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND INDEFINITENESS
A. Claim Construction as Threshold Step
Since “[n]either written words nor the sounds that the written words
represent have any inherent meaning,” words only acquire meaning from
context.15 In patent law, claim construction is the process of determining
meaning from the relevant context,16 including the rest of the claim
language, the written description of the invention in the patent
specification, the Patent Office record, and technical texts or expert
testimony about the background understanding in the field.17
Context is necessary to determine meaning, even for technically-savvy
people reading technical terms.18 As a result, claim construction does not
just occur ex post in litigation to help lay juries, as suggested in the
Nautilus briefing.19 “Claim construction is conducted by all players in the
patent system,” including the Patent Office, competitors, investors, and
researchers.20 Even in litigation, claims are construed to have “the
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
question at the time of the invention,”21 which is not necessarily
understandable to lay people.22

15. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS, at xxvii, 33, 167 (2012).
16. 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03[2] (2006).
17. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
18. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1752–53 (2009).
19. See Nautilus Br., supra note 7, at 46 (“Many claim-construction disputes do not involve real
disagreement over a claim’s scope, but only over the manner in which the words of the claim should
be described in laypersons’ terms for the jury.”).
20. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of
the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW 123, 125 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
21. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13.
22. See, e.g., Butamax™ Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc., 746 F.3d 1302, 1313–14 (Fed.
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Thus, claim terms cannot be unambiguous on their face without resort
to context through claim construction, as proposed by some in Nautilus.23
To the contrary, the Supreme Court and other courts have consistently
evaluated indefiniteness only after looking to context for meaning, i.e.,
after claim construction.24 Despite the suggestions in the Nautilus
briefing,25 this does not mean that litigation is necessary to ascertain claim
scope. In theory, observers ex ante should be able to “understand what is
the scope of the patent owner’s rights by obtaining the patent and
prosecution history . . . and applying established rules of construction” and
“be able to rest assured . . . that a judge . . . will similarly analyze the text
of the patent and its associated public record and apply the established
rules of construction” to reach the same construction.26
B. Claim Construction’s Impact on Patent Uncertainty
Claim construction is crucial to the certainty of patent scope. As is true
of all words,27 “claims which on first reading—in a vacuum, if you will—
appear indefinite may upon a reading of the specification disclosure or
prior art teachings become quite definite.”28 For example, a claim may use
an unusual word or words in an unusual way or combination, which, in the
abstract, would make claim scope uncertain. No uncertainty exists,
however, if the specification expressly defines the term29 or uses it in a
way that makes its meaning clear.30
Cir. 2014) (construing term to mean “an enzyme, whether naturally occurring or otherwise, known by
the EC number 1.1.1.86 that catalyzes the conversion of acetolactate to 2,3-dihydroxyisovalerate”);
Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., et al., No. 2012-1576, slip op. at 10; 2014 WL 463757, at *3
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding term “was correctly construed to include 3-isobutylGABA regardless of its
enantiomeric forms . . . “).
23. See Amazon Br., supra note 7, at 18–19 (arguing that clarity of a patent’s scope should be
required when the patent issues).
24. See, e.g., United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 233–36 (1942) (looking
to specification and testimony of skilled person); Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265
F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Merat, 519 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Ga.-Pac. Corp.
v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 1958).
25. See Amazon Br., supra note 7, at 18–19.
26. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978–79 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (citation omitted).
27. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 32–33.
28. Merat, 519 F.2d at 1394 n. 2 (quotations omitted).
29. See Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 705–06
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (term lacking well-understood meaning not indefinite because of express specification
definition).
30. See Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 493 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (specification “clearly communicates” that claim used “heading” to mean “bearing”).
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Claim construction’s impact on uncertain patent scope depends on how
effective its rules are at leading different observers to reach the same
conclusion on claim meaning, which in turn depends both on whether the
rules for claim construction are well-established and indisputable and
whether the substance of those rules is likely to generate a single meaning,
rather than a range of possible meanings.31 The more effective the claim
construction rules, the fewer uncertain patents will remain to which
indefiniteness could apply. Conversely, the less effective the claim
construction rules, more uncertain patents will remain for potential
invalidation for indefiniteness.
III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND UNCERTAIN CLAIM SCOPE
A. Blaming Claim Construction for Uncertain Patent Scope
Unsurprisingly, large segments of the patent community sought to
tighten the indefiniteness standard in Nautilus. The Federal Circuit’s claim
construction rules are a complete mess, increasing the need for
indefiniteness to invalidate uncertain patents and protect public notice.
Surprisingly, though, the “broken” claim construction rules that have
“engross[ed]” commentators and Federal Circuit judges in the past32
received only passing and vague reference in the Nautilus briefing.33
Instead, the Supreme Court was told that the failure of patents to
“reasonably inform those skilled in the art about the invention’s scope,”34
which undermines their “public-notice function”35 of identifying “the
metes and bounds of the claimed invention,” was caused by the Federal
Circuit’s lax indefiniteness standard.36 The consequences of this weak
indefiniteness doctrine were said to include: (1) a range of possible claim
scopes, rather than a single discernible scope;37 (2) “changing, even

31. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope
Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 99–100 (2005).
32. Lefstin, supra note 3, at 1033–1035.
33. See Brief of Microsoft Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 24–25, Biosig
Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 542 U.S. __; No. 13-369, slip op. (June 2, 2014), 2014 WL 880964,
at *24–25 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Microsoft Br.] (mentioning panel-dependence and high
reversal rates of claim construction); see also AARP Br., supra note 8, at 6 (noting that claim
construction is confusing and difficult); Menell Br., supra note 7, at 9–10 (briefly identifying four
problems previously attributed to claim construction); Yahoo! Br., supra note 8, at 15 (noting in
passing that some uncertainties “are best redressed by proper claim construction”).
34. See Yahoo! Br., supra note 8, at 3.
35. Id. at 10.
36. Id. at 5.
37. Nautilus Br., supra note 7, at 33.
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inconsistent positions” by the patentee;38 (3) claim scope that is only
knowable after litigation and appeal to the Federal Circuit;39
(4) exploitation of ambiguous claims to expand patent scope beyond the
patentee’s actual invention;40 (5) incentives to draft ambiguous patent
claims;41 (6) chilling of follow-on innovation and competition;42
(7) increased cost and risk for competitors;43 (8) increased disputes and
litigation over claim scope;44 and (9) greater difficulty for courts in
discerning claim scope.45
Yet, before Nautilus, the indefiniteness doctrine was largely an
afterthought in the debate over uncertain patent scope,46 and the Federal
Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence was blamed for the failure of
public notice: “uncertainty over the proper procedure for claim
construction has led to uncertainty in patent scope, which in turn negates
the notice and boundary-staking functions to be performed by the patent
claim.”47 Indeed, each of the consequences of poor notice now attributed
to indefiniteness has been blamed in the past on claim construction.48
Thus, the myopic focus on the indefiniteness doctrine in Nautilus left the
Supreme Court with imperfect information on the source of uncertainty in
claim scope, contributing to a sub-optimal resolution.
B. Claim Construction’s Contribution to Uncertain Claim Scope
For good reason, uncertain claim scope has long been associated with
failed claim construction rules. The Federal Circuit’s claim construction
jurisprudence creates uncertainty in at least two, and perhaps three, ways.
First, the rules for claim construction are unpredictable. A persistent
methodological split exists in the Federal Circuit as to whether claim

38. Id. at 47.
39. Id. at 30–31.
40. Id. at 38–39.
41. Id. at 30–32.
42. Id. at 29–30
43. Id. at 28–29.
44. Microsoft Br., supra note 33, at 31–33.
45. See Nautilus Br., supra note 7, at 33–34.
46. A search of SSRN on April 11, 2014 for the terms “indefiniteness” and “patent” yielded four
results, but a search for “claim construction” and “patent” yielded 101.
47. Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61, 64 (2006).
48. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 57–58 (patentee inconsistency); Burk & Lemley,
supra note 18, at 1762 (incentives to draft and exploit ambiguous claims); William R. Hubbard,
Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Rights: The Importance of Ex Post Delineation, 25
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 327, 338 (2009) (chills innovation and competition;
increases business costs, claim construction disputes, litigation, and costs of determining scope);
Lefstin, supra note 3, at 1062–63 (range of meanings; uncertainty until appellate construction).
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construction focuses on a term’s general meaning in the field of the
invention (as evidenced through expert testimony or technical
publications), with only limited resort to the description in the patent itself,
or on the term’s use in the patent itself, with only limited resort to extrinsic
evidence for background.49 These divergent methodologies generally lead
to different claim scope and “appear[] to be the genesis of almost all
disputes” over the meaning of patent claims.50 This methodological split is
one of, if not the, major causes of uncertainty in patent scope.51 Prelitigation, each party can adopt the approach that best suits its interests,
undermining licensing efforts and encouraging litigation. Neither party can
reliably predict the actual claim scope, which depends on the district
judge’s choice of methodological approach and (absent settlement)
whether this choice is the same as that of two of the three judges on the
Federal Circuit panel.52
Second, uncertainty exists because some Federal Circuit cases continue
to emphasize the general meaning in the field, as evidenced by extrinsic
texts or expert testimony. Due to the difficulty of identifying the precise
field and skill level of the invention and finding a source in the precise
field and at the precise skill level and time, there is likely to be a variety of
equally plausible sources, often with varying meanings, undermining
efforts to accurately predict claim scope ex ante and encouraging
gamesmanship in litigation.53 Although a few commentators continue to
believe that the general meaning approach best promotes predictability,54
there is growing recognition that focusing on how a claim term is used in
the publicly-available patent and Patent Office record puts all consumers
of claim construction on the same footing and increases the chances that
different observers will reach the same construction, enhancing certainty
in claim scope.55
Third, for years, large segments of the patent community contended
that the Federal Circuit’s de novo review of district court claim

49. See Cotropia, supra note 31, at 82–93.
50. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1144 (2004); see also id. at 57, 105–
115 .
51. See, e.g., Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 2012-1014, slip
op. at 27 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (en banc) (quoting amicus brief of Google, Amazon, HewlettPackard, Red Hat and Yahoo!); Osenga, supra note 47, at 71–73.
52. Osenga, supra note 47, at 71–72.
53. See Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary Reader
Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 271–77 (2014).
54. See, e.g., Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 20, at 144.
55. See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at 102.
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constructions was the primary cause of uncertainty.56 I previously
questioned this view because de novo review only affects ex post certainty
of the few patents litigated to a district court claim construction, not the far
more important ex ante predictability of claim scope pre-litigation,57 a
position that was recently endorsed by the en banc Federal Circuit.58
Regardless, many respected observers have blamed uncertainty on de novo
review of claim construction, but virtually no mention was made of it in
the Nautilus briefing.
IV. OPTIMIZING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND INDEFINITENESS
A. Indefiniteness in the Time of Claim Construction Uncertainty
The pervasive problems with the Federal Circuit’s claim construction
rules have perverse effects. They increase the need for indefiniteness to
police uncertainty in claim scope, while at the same time rendering the
Federal Circuit’s pre-Nautilus indefiniteness standard less effective and
the consequences of tightening the standard untenable.
The ineffectiveness of the Federal Circuit’s claim construction
jurisprudence reduces the number of patent claims whose scope is
predictable ex ante through resort to contextual information, increasing the
problem of uncertain patent scope. This imposes a greater need to
invalidate patents as indefinite to protect public notice, a need that played
out in Nautilus.
At same time, the claim construction problems undermined the
effectiveness of the Federal Circuit’s pre-Nautilus indefiniteness
standard—whether a claim is not amenable to construction or insolubly
ambiguous—at weeding out uncertain patent claims. Courts had two
equally plausible methodologies with which to “solve” any ambiguity. If
the patent-focused approach did not yield a clear answer, the court could
turn to the general-meaning-focused approach, and vice-versa. Moreover,
current doctrine allows a construction based on extrinsic evidence of the
supposed general meaning in the field, even if not tied to the patent itself.
Almost always, there will be some text or expert witness to support a

56. Lefstin, supra note 3, at 1034–35.
57. See Greg Reilly, Improvidently Granted: Why the En Banc Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong
Claim Construction Issue, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 43 (2013), available at https://lawreview.
uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/Reilly_Online_Final.pdf.
58. See, e.g., Lighting Ballast, slip op. at 26–30. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to
address the proper standard of review for claim construction, albeit not in the Lighting Ballast case.
See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1621, 2014 WL 1516642 (2014).
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supposed general meaning, no matter how obscure. Indefiniteness was
therefore a rare outcome59 because virtually any claim will be amenable to
construction and any ambiguity “solvable” ex post in litigation due to
open-ended claim construction rules. Of course, the open-ended nature of
claim construction rules also means that this “solution” often will not be
predictable ex ante, resulting in rampant uncertainty of claim scope.
In light of the increased need for indefiniteness and decreased
effectiveness of the Federal Circuit’s doctrine, many in Nautilus logically
sought to tighten the indefiniteness standard. Unfortunately, the claim
construction problems also make it nearly impossible to tighten
indefiniteness without gutting the patent system. Nautilus’s proposed
“more than one reasonable interpretation” standard would leave virtually
every patent susceptible to invalidation, as many amici argued even
without raising claim construction problems.60 The two competing
methodologies, each equally reasonable under existing law, often lead to
different interpretations, while parties normally can identify more than one
reasonable meaning from extrinsic texts or expert testimony.
Even the more moderate proposal for a “reasonable certainty” standard,
ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court, could imperil a substantial
number of patents under the current state of claim construction. How
many claims can be said to be “reasonably certain” ex ante when a court is
equally justified in choosing between two different methodologies that
lead to different substantive interpretations? Or when an observer cannot
reliably predict ex ante what obscure technical text or self-interested
expert testimony a court will rely upon in adversarial litigation? In fact,
under current rules, an observer cannot even be confident that courts will
honor the patent’s express definition of a term if it departs from the
supposed “plain and ordinary meaning.”61
Thus, in the face of pervasive uncertainty in claim construction,
tightening the indefiniteness standard to resolve uncertain patent scope
comes at the cost of imperiling large swaths of patents, patents that would
be at risk largely because the Federal Circuit has failed at claim
construction. Faced with these consequences, it is not surprising that the
Federal Circuit considered a claim definite as long as it could “be given
any reasonable meaning.”62
59. Amazon Br., supra note 7, at 14–15 (noting that “fewer than 6% of patent invalidations are
based on indefiniteness”).
60. See, e.g., Yahoo! Br., supra note 8, at 5.
61. Butamax™, slip op. at 10–18.
62. Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F. 3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis
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B. Solving the Uncertainty of Patent Scope?
The Supreme Court faced the unenviable choice in Nautilus of either
affirming the Federal Circuit’s indefiniteness standard and endorsing
rampant uncertainty in patent scope or tightening the standard and
imperiling large numbers of patents. The result was an opinion that did not
say particularly much. There has to be a better way to combat uncertain
patent scope.
An obvious first step is to correct the Federal Circuit’s claim
construction failures. Simply adopting a single methodology would create
“an inherent certainty.”63 Choosing the patent-focused methodology is
even more promising “[f]rom a notice perspective,” as this “material is
easily identifiable by, and accessible to, third parties” ex ante, whereas
observers “cannot know in advance what external evidence will be
utilized” under a general-meaning-focused approach.64 Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to review claim construction
problems,65 leaving the Court in the position it faced in Nautilus.
Under well-functioning claim construction rules, an indefiniteness
standard is still needed to address uncertain scope not resolved by resort to
context. The “more than one reasonable interpretation” standard would
remain overbroad. Even with optimal claim construction rules, there will
often be multiple reasonable, even if not likely, interpretations, sometimes
because of the patentee’s strategic drafting but often because of the
inherent shortcomings of language or the skills and incentives of litigators.
When a competitor applying well-functioning claim construction rules can
predict two possible constructions, with say one seventy-five percent
likely and the other twenty-five percent likely, claim scope is sufficiently
predictable and the possibility of a wrong prediction is part of ordinary
business risk that can be factored into an activity’s cost-benefit analysis.66
Invalidating the patent as indefinite in such circumstances is a draconian
remedy in pursuit of unobtainable absolute certainty.

added; quotations omitted).
63. Cotropia, supra note 31, at 99.
64. See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at 102.
65. See, e.g., Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC v. Medtronic Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014)
(denying certiorari); Retractable Technologies Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 133 S. Ct. 833 (2013)
(denying certiorari).
66. Cf. Brief of Biotechnology Indus. Org. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 27–28,
Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 542 U.S. __; No. 13-369, slip op. (June 2, 2014), 2014 WL
1348469, at *27–28 (Apr. 2, 2014).
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By contrast, the more moderate “reasonable certainty” standard
adopted by the Supreme Court is consistent with a pursuit of
predictability, not absolute certainty. If claim scope is “reasonably clear,”
competitors can reliably predict the likelihood of a particular scope and
evaluate the risk of a wrong prediction. At the same time, it is odd to
address an uncertainty problem with a vague standard like “reasonable
certainty.” How likely must a particular interpretation be to be “reasonably
certain”? Fifty-five percent? Eighty percent? The vagueness of
“reasonable certainty” could undermine efforts to predict claim scope, as it
would be difficult to know when a claim had valid scope and when it was
invalid as indefinite.67 This could encourage disputes over indefiniteness,
hindering licensing and settlement efforts and increasing litigation.
Likewise, parties could be encouraged to more vigorously dispute claim
construction, knowing that even a clear losing argument could be deemed
sufficiently strong to invalidate the claim as not “reasonably certain.”
Surprisingly, with improved claim construction rules, the most sensible
indefiniteness standard would be a clarified version of the Federal
Circuit’s pre-Nautilus standard. In most cases, the improved claim
construction rules would make claim scope sufficiently predictable ex
ante. Only in limited cases would resort to context fail to “solve” the
ambiguity in claim scope, which could occur in two ways under the
preferred patent-focused methodology. First, the patent may provide
insufficient contextual information to solve the ambiguity by, for example,
not using a claim term in the rest of the patent or doing so only vaguely or
in passing. Second, a term could be used in different, inconsistent, or
ambiguous ways in different parts of the patent, giving rise to two equally
plausible interpretations. Invalidation for indefiniteness would be
appropriate in these circumstances where the claim term “is not amenable
to construction” because there is insufficient contextual information or is
“insolubly ambiguous” because the contextual information leads to two
equally plausible interpretations.68 This is essentially the Federal Circuit’s
pre-Nautilus standard, except clarifying “insolubly ambiguous” to include
two equally plausible interpretations, not just the absence of any plausible
interpretation.
Thus, the indefiniteness doctrine would play a crucial role in protecting
public notice even with a better claim construction process by invalidating
67. See Mann, supra note 14 (suggesting Supreme Court “reasonable certainty” standard “will
turn out to have made the boundary between definite and indefinite even less clear than it was before
the Court addressed the question”).
68. Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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the limited patent claims that remain ambiguous or vague even after
applying the improved claim construction rules. More importantly, it
would incentivize patent drafters to provide sufficient, and sufficiently
clear, contextual information in the first place, increasing claim
construction’s effectiveness at providing public notice ex ante and
decreasing the need to protect public notice only ex post through
invalidation. Admittedly, as compared to a “reasonable certainty”
standard, the Federal Circuit’s pre-Nautilus standard would not eliminate
as many close calls on claim construction (e.g., where one construction is
fifty-five percent likely and the other is forty-five percent likely) or
provide as strong incentives for clear drafting, at least in theory. But
“equally plausible” is a clearer rule than “reasonable certainty,” improving
the predictability of the indefiniteness determination and better facilitating
planning, licensing, and settlement. Any need for clearer drafting could be
satisfied by new requirements for patent applications, such as glossaries of
key terms.69
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court backed itself into a corner in Nautilus by choosing
to address uncertain patent scope through indefiniteness, not claim
construction. Likely seeking any result that will combat so-called “patent
trolls,”70 the patent community exacerbated the problem by failing to
inform the Court of the well-recognized problems with claim construction.
Unfortunately, there was no clear path to a good result in Nautilus. The
only sensible approach is to first fix the Federal Circuit’s failed claim
construction jurisprudence.

69. See FTC REPORT, supra note 2, at 107–12.
70. See, e.g., Amazon Br., supra note 7, at 2–3; Microsoft Br., supra note 33, at 4–5.
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